Price Dispersion with Directed Search. by Camera, Gabriele & Selcuk, Cemil
KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL 
OF MANAGEMENT 
 
  Purdue  University 
  West  Lafayette,  Indiana 
 
 




Gabriele Camera and Cemil Selçuk 
 
Paper No. 1173  
Date:  December 2004 
Institute for Research in the 
Behavioral, Economic, and 
Management Sciences Price Dispersion with Directed Search1
Gabriele Camera Cemil Selçuk
Purdue University Purdue University
December 28, 2004
Abstract
We study a market where identical capacity-constrained sellers compete to attract identical buyers,
via price advertisements. Once buyers reach a store, prices might be renegotiable in a manner that
is responsive to excess demand. We focus on strongly symmetric equilibria, proving their existence
and providing explicit solutions for the distributions of advertised and sale prices as functions of
market characteristics. Since variations in the posted price can aﬀect the store’s attractiveness
and the incidence of haggling, the model endogenizes the ‘pricing convention’ prevailing in the
market and generates several empirically testable predictions on market behavior.
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The existence of price disparities for homogeneous products is empirically well docu-
mented (e.g. see Pratt et al., 1979 or Baye et al., 2004). In providing a rationale for such
observations, the theoretical literature has stressed the importance of market frictions,
for instance information heterogeneity as in Varian (1980) or costly search as in Carlson
and McAfee (1983). Several studies have relied on frameworks where frictions are made
explicit by means of a trade process based on random search. This friction limits the
information available on prices in Burdett and Judd (1983), for example, and impairs the
buyers’ ability to match to the cheapest sellers in Camera and Corbae (1999).
Our work broadly contributes to this research discourse. We study the theoretical
underpinnings of equilibrium price dispersion in a market for a homogeneous good or
service. We do not impose ex-ante heterogeneity elements or information frictions and
make trade frictions explicit by assuming a process of exchange that is decentralized and
subject to spatial and capacity constraints. We also set buyers free to direct their search:
trade matches do not follow the rather disorganized process of stochastic encounters so
common in matching frameworks. Rather, buyers are free to go where they prefer–much
as the “informed customers” in the pricing game studied by Baye et al. (1992)–and
stores compete to attract buyers by costlessly advertising (or posting) a price.
Our model is based on that of Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). There, a countable
number of buyers and capacity-constrained sellers makes uncoordinated pricing and trad-
ing choices. Every buyer likes equally the indivisible good owned by each seller. Every
seller advertises a price at which she commits to sell and, given this information, buyers
independently select to approach a seller. In a symmetric equilibrium, sellers compete
for customers by listing a price below the buyer’s reserve value and buyers are indiﬀer-
ent across stores. Although this creates a non-degenerate distribution of demand, every
sale occurs at the listed price and stores that realize excess demand simply ration their
good. Hence, the price distribution is degenerate, unless heterogeneity is introduced (e.g.
rationing-wary buyers may prefer ‘larger’ stores, which thus advertise higher prices).
In reality, capacity-constrained sellers have incentives to sell above the advertised price
when demand is unusually high or to attract customers by committing to price reductions
if business is slow. This is perhaps why houses tend to sell above their list price in the
densely populated L.A. county (unlike Tippecanoe county), why new hot car models trade
above their MSRP (unlike older ones), why hotels rent rooms below the advertised prices
when demand is slow, or why airlines list fares ‘subject to change without notice.’ In
short, it is desirable to account for the fact that sale prices tend to respond to excess
1demand, even if advertised prices do not.
To do so we generalize Burdett et al. relaxing the assumption that the listing of a
price necessarily precludes further negotiations at the store.2 For instance, we consider
markets where sellers can exclude discounts but are free to suddenly raise the sale price,
or markets with better consumer protection, where stores can oﬀer price reductions but
cannot sell above the advertised price. Of course, when the posted price is not binding one
must indicate how sale prices are determined. For generality, we do not impose a speciﬁc
price-formation protocol; instead, we provide results valid under any protocol generating
prices that increase in the store’s excess demand.
In this framework we prove a theorem of existence of strongly symmetric subgame
perfect equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which agents take the same action both on and oﬀ the
equilibrium path. Symmetry oﬀers enough tractability to fully characterize the distribu-
tions of advertised and sale prices by means of explicit solutions. Hence, the model can be
used to make predictions on market behavior that can be empirically tested. For example,
we ﬁnd that haggling over price discounts–as car dealers tend to do–is generally optimal
from the seller’s point of view only if the expected demand matches the store’s capacity.
Otherwise, trading at a ﬁxed price is more proﬁtable.
Equilibrium prices respond intuitively to commitment and market composition. Gen-
erally speaking, sellers advertise low prices in markets that have a small customer base.
In such a ‘buyer’s market’ average sale prices are low but dispersion in sale prices is con-
siderable. As the customer base expands we move into a seller’s market where advertised
and average sale prices grow, but their dispersion drops. What is the intuition? When
the customer base is small, a store’s distribution of demand–hence expected proﬁt–
impinges heavily on the distribution of demand at other stores. Realizing this, stores
compete aggressively for customers by listing low prices. As the customer base expands
the covariance of demand across stores falls, lessening the need to compete.
Our analysis also contributes to a growing literature on endogenous selection of pricing
mechanisms (see Camera and Delacroix, 2004, for references). Indeed, the ‘pricing conven-
tion’ adopted in the market, i.e. the incidence of ﬁxed-price trading versus negotiations,
is determined endogenously. We ﬁnd that if sellers can commit to avoid price reductions,
2Coles and Eeckhout (2003), take a similar viewpoint letting stores run an auction in Burdett et al. A
two-point price distribution arises but sale prices are invariant to excess demand (be it two or two-million
buyers), to market size and composition. Arbatskaya (2004) studies the distribution of prices when stores
commit to a posted price but are sampled in a predetermined order by consumers diﬀe r i n gi ns e a r c hc o s t s .
Those with higher cost search less and spend more.
2then haggling is pervasive in a buyer’s market but very rare in a seller’s market. The
opposite occurs when prices cannot exceed what advertised. To the extent that haggling
involves a resource cost (say, time or personnel) the model provides a rationale as to why
ﬁxed-price sales seem the convention in large but not in smaller markets.
2T h eM o d e l
The environment builds on the directed search model of Burdett, Shi and Wright
(2001). It is a static economy with one indivisible good type, capacity constraints, and
a ﬁnite number of spatially separated agents; S ≥ 2 identical sellers with one good each,
and B ≥ 2 identical buyers without endowment. The good generates consumption utility
linear in consumption and normalized to zero, for a seller, and one, for a buyer. Utility is
also transferable so there are gains from trade.
Sellers compete for buyers. They advertise by posting a publicly observable price
r ∈ [0,1],t h ereference price (alternatively, advertised or posted price). In this context
the act of “posting” r simply makes it costlessly observable to every market participant.
Once reference prices have been posted, buyers simultaneously and independently select
to visit a single seller (search for a second store is assumed very costly). Since buyers’
choices are uncoordinated, diﬀerent stores might be visited by diﬀerent number of buyers.
To account for this possibility we let n =0 ,1,2...,B denote the realized demand at the
store, i.e. the number of buyers who end up visiting the store.
We also deﬁne the variable λ = B
S we call the “customer base” of a store, to capture
the notion of market composition. If there are many sellers but only few buyers, then
stores have a small customer base λ and we are in a buyer’s market.W h e nλ is large we
are in a seller’s market with few stores serving a large customer base. Any n>1 results in
excess demand due to capacity constraints. In this case the seller selects a buyer to trade
with, at random. Thus, the existence of unit-capacity constraints contributes to make
trade frictions explicit. In equilibrium, market participants may experience idiosyncratic
trading risk; seller can experience demand shocks, while buyers can experience rationing.
Regarding sale price determination we relax Burdett et al.’s assumption that sellers
commit to charge r. Precisely, consider a store with n customers. As in Burdett et al.
we assume that the seller chooses a buyer at random, with equal probability among all
n present at the store. However, we consider the possibility that the transaction price
might diﬀer from r, being determined via some endogenous price-formation mechanism–
referred to as “negotiations” for short–that is taken as given. The available commit-
ment technology speciﬁes whether negotiations can take place and who can initiate them.
3Speciﬁcally–once the seller has chosen a customer–the technology exogenously gives to
either the seller or the buyer (or both) the option to initiate negotiations. We denote by
θ =(θb,θs) such a technology, where θi =0 ,1 is the probability that agent i = b,s (b for
buyer and s for seller) is given the option to initiate negotiations. We clarify how this
formalization captures four broad notions of price commitments, in what follows.
3 The Determination of Sale Prices
The economic interactions can be thought of as proceeding in three stages. First sellers
choose and ‘post’ r simultaneously and independently. These selections are observed by
every agent. In the second stage, buyers choose which store to visit, simultaneously and
independently. Following these selections, every buyer reaches some store and the demand
realized at that store is observed by everyone present. In the third stage, at each store
the seller selects a buyer at random, among those present. Following this selection a sale
may take place at a price that is diﬀerent from what originally posted, depending on the
seller’s ability to commit to it.
We study the strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of this economy. These
are outcomes in which agents take the same action both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path
(see Abreu, 1986). In particular, in equilibrium every store optimally selects the same
reference price r and every buyer optimally visits any store with equal probability. We
move backwards in the analysis starting by determining the optimal sale price at a store
that has posted r and is visited by n buyers. Then, we study the optimal choice of store,
for the representative buyer, and the optimal choice of price r for the representative store.
We start by deriving the optimal sale price, given some θ, at a store that posted r and
has n customers.
3.1 The Outcome of Negotiations at the Store
Consider a match between a seller i =1 ,2,...,S and n =1 ,...,B buyers; n is ob-
served by everyone in the match. Abstract (for a moment) from r and suppose seller and
buyers were free to determine the transaction price via some endogenous price-formation
mechanism that is taken as given by everyone.3 Let qn be the price arising from such a
negotiations process, denoting q0 =0and qB+1 =1 . For generality we do not impose a
speciﬁc mechanism but simply make three assumptions on the properties of its outcome.
First, the price-formation mechanism leads to a trade without delay at a unique price qn.
3For example, the seller can auction the good (as in Coles and Eeckhout, 2003, or Benoit, Kennes and
King, 2000) or there can be a negotation process whereby the seller makes an initial proposal to some
buyer, calling onto other buyers if the initial oﬀer is rejected, as in Camera and Selcuk (2004).
4Second, no party gets the entire surplus. Third, the resulting price responds positively to
excess demand at the store, but is unaﬀected by factors outside the store (e.g. distribution
of demand elsewhere). Formally, assume






=0for all n =1 ,...,B. (1)
A negotiation framework that generates (1) is studied by Camera and Selcuk (2004).
There, one seller and n buyers randomly alternate in making oﬀers, discounting future




This captures the notion that–when demand is strong–stores can negotiate prices up
by playing buyers against each other. Our numerical analysis will assume qn satisﬁes (2)
with γ =0 .3 and β =0 .9.
3.2 The Sale Price at a Store Visited by n Customers
Now that we know the outcome of possible negotiations, we can discuss the sale price.
Denote pn t h es a l ep r i c ea tas t o r ev i s i t e db yn ≥ 1 buyers, letting p0 =0 . Linearity in
preferences implies that the seller enjoys utility pn and the buyer 1 − pn.
The interaction between seller and the n customers proceeds as follows. The seller
chooses a buyer at random, with equal probability among all n present at the store.
Then, depending on the commitment technology θ =(θb,θs), someone may get the option
to start the negotiations process. Given this option, denote ηi the (conditional) probability
to start negotiations, for i = b,s. It is assumed that if no-one selects negotiations trade
takes place at the listed price, so pn = r. Otherwise, negotiations take place and result in
t h es a l ep r i c epn = qn. If we focus on pure strategies, the individually optimal choices are
ηs =
 
1 if r<q n
0 if r ≥ qn
and ηb =
 
0 if r<q n
1 if r ≥ qn.
(3)
It follows
Lemma 1. Let r ∈ [0,1] be the price posted by a store visited by n =1 ,...,B buyers and
let qn be the price expected to arise from negotiations. Then trade takes place at price
pn =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
qn if θ = θN ≡ (1,1)
min(qn,r) if θ = θC ≡ (1,0)
max(qn,r) if θ = θF ≡ (0,1)
r if θ = θX ≡ (0,0).
(4)
5The commitment technology θ = θk,f o rk = C,F,N,X, delimits the set of sale prices,
relative to r, allowing us to formalize four basic notions of pricing conventions:
θs =0 θs =1
θb =0 Fixed Prices Price Floors
θb =1 Price Ceilings Negotiations
If θ = θN we say that there is no commitment to the posted price, while sales necessarily
occur at that price when there is full commitment, i.e. θ = θX (as assumed in Burdett et
al.). We can then have two cases with limited commitment: the ‘price ﬂoor’ θ = θF,w h e n
sellers charge at least r, and the ‘price ceiling’ θ = θC when sale prices cannot exceed r.4
The proof of the Lemma is obvious. Once the seller selects a buyer to trade with–
among the n identical buyers present at the store–they both know that negotiations will
generate qn. Thus, the buyer will negotiate–if given the option–only if qn ≤ r. The
converse is true for the seller. Thus, pn ≤ r under price ceilings and pn ≥ r under price
ﬂoors. Using (4) we let
P = {r} ∪ {qn}B
n=1 (5)
denote the ordered set of possible equilibrium sale prices, for any given θ and any possible
n. We will let p denote a generic element of P.
When qn satisﬁes (1), then {qn − qn−1}
B
n=1 is a positive decreasing sequence, so {pn}
B
n=1
and {pn − pn−1}
B
n=1 are non-decreasing and non-increasing. In short, the sale price pn
tends to increase in the excess demand. From (4) we see that pn is deﬁned by functions
that are continuous and non-decreasing in r, bounded above by one and below by zero.
Also,
∂pn
∂r =0 ,1 depending on both r and θ. Clearly,
∂pn
∂r =0if pn = qn and
∂pn
∂r =1
if pn = r. However,
∂pn
∂r =1either (i) if r<q n when pn =m i n ( qn,r) or (ii) if r ≥ qn
when pn =m a x ( qn,r); it is zero otherwise. Thus, we say that sale prices at store i are
responsive to the price posted by the store if
∂pn
∂r =1for some n ≥ 1.O f c o u r s e , s a l e
prices will generally responsive to r only if some commitment is available.
There are two key consequences. First, variations in the posted price r will impinge on
the store’s “attractiveness”, i.e., the buyers’ choice to visit it, whenever the posted price
aﬀects the set of feasible sale prices. Second, a weakening of the commitment to a ﬁxed
4A practical way to commit to a certain price (or price range) is by means of hiring sale representatives.
For example, the commitment to ﬁxed prices is credible if reps trading at non-authorized prices are ﬁred,
and the commitment to charging at least r is credible is sale reps are compensated by pn − r.
6price r implies that sale prices will not solely hinge on the posted price (as in Burdett et
al.) but also on the excess demand experienced by the store. Thus, in our framework a
change in the reference price r has a strategic impact not only because it may modify the
distribution of buyers at the store, but also because it may aﬀect the distribution of sale
prices at that establishment. This is formalized in the following section.
4 Individually Optimal Selection of Prices and Stores
We now study the visiting and pricing choices of a representative agent. Recall that
we are focusing on strongly symmetric equilibria and that agents make choices in isolation
taking as given the strategies of others. Thus, we diﬀerentiate the strategy of everyone
else from that of a representative buyer or seller, by using a superscript ‘∗’.
4.1 The buyer’s problem
Let vi denote the probability that the representative buyer visits store i =1 ,2,...,S,
and deﬁne v =( vi)
S
i=1 . Thus, v ∈ ∆S, i.e. v is a vector in the S−dimensional unit simplex
∆S = {v ∈ RS : v ≥ 0 and
S  
i=1
vi =1 }.T oﬁnd the optimal v we must examine how the
buyer’s expected payoﬀ, conditional on being at store i, compares to the expected payoﬀ
from being at any other store.
To do so suppose that store i posts r and every other store posts r∗,p o s s i b l yd i ﬀerent
than r.D e n o t eb yfn(B,v∗
i ) the probability that a speciﬁc seller i is visited exactly by n
out of B possible buyers, given that every buyer visits this store with probability v∗
i . Since
buyers choose stores in an uncoordinated manner the probability of visiting any store is
independent across buyers. It follows that, under symmetry, the distribution of buyers at










n (1 − v∗
i )B−n for n =0 ,1,...,B. (6)
It follows that, conditional on being at store i, the representative buyer faces proba-
bility fn(B −1,v∗
i ) that there are n =0 ,1,...,B −1 other customers. In that contingency
the expected payoﬀ for the buyer is
1−pn+1
n+1 . Given the expected sale price pn+1,t h e n
1 − pn+1 is the buyer’s payoﬀ if he gets to buy, which occurs with probability 1
1+n.





i )(1 − pn+1)
n +1
. (7)
Clearly, the buyer prefers to visit the store where Ui is the highest. It is easy to
demonstrate (see also the proof of Lemma 3, later) that, all else equal, Ui is lower at
7more ‘popular stores’, i.e. ∂Ui
∂v∗
i < 0. This result hinges on the higher expected demand
g e n e r a t e db yal a r g e rv∗
i . First, there is always an extensive margin eﬀect: the buyer’s
ability to make a purchase falls as the number of customers increases, because stores are
capacity constrained. Second, there may be an intensive margin eﬀect: higher expected
demand means higher prices since {pn} is a non-decreasing sequence.
Expression (7) tells us that, all else equal, the representative buyer will prefer to be
at stores expected to be less crowded or with lower sale prices. It follows that a buyer
may be indiﬀerent between a cheap and an expensive store, if the latter is also likely to
have less customers. Of course, from our earlier discussion we know that–given n–the
sale price may diﬀer across stores only if the stores advertised diﬀerent prices (see (4)).
Now consider the representative buyer’s selection of store i versus other stores, given
that everybody else is playing an identical strategy (strong symmetry). He can visit store
i that has posted r and sells at prices {pn},o rany other store h  = i that has posted r∗
and sells at prices {p∗
n}. Given that v∗ is the selection of every other buyer, then we have
v∗






a decreasing function of v∗
i .D e n o t eb yU the representative buyer’s expected payoﬀ from













1 if Ui >U
[0,1] if Ui = U
0 if Ui <U
(10)
then we say that vi is individually optimal or, equivalently, that it is a best response of




where vi depends on posted prices only if these aﬀect sale prices, and it depends on the
choices v∗
i of other buyers, as these aﬀect the representative buyer’s trading risk.
4.2 The seller’s problem
Given some commitment technology θ,h e r ew ed i s c u s st h ec h o i c er of a representative
seller i when every other seller selects r∗ and every other buyer plays v∗. Clearly, the op-
timal r must maximize the seller’s expected proﬁt from trading that depends on expected
8demand, i.e. the probability of visits v∗
i , and on the possible sale prices {pn}.S i n c e v∗






Since r is chosen while taking as given r∗,w ed e ﬁne the seller’s choice set by letting
ϕ :[ 0 ,1] @ [0,1] deﬁne a continuous correspondence with nonempty compact values such
that ϕ(r∗)=[ 0 ,1] for r∗ ∈ [0,1]. Thus, we can deﬁne the “value function” ˆ W :[ 0 ,1]2 →
[0,1] by
ˆ W(r)= m a x
r∈ϕ(r∗)
W(r,r∗)
and the correspondence µ :[ 0 ,1] @ [0,1] of maximizers
µ(r∗)=
 
r ∈ ϕ(r∗):W(r,r∗)= ˆ W(r)
 
.
Therefore, if µ is nonempty valued, we say that r is individually optimal or, equivalently,
it is a best response of seller i, if
r ∈ µ(r∗). (12)
Of course, in a symmetric equilibrium sellers must post identical prices, or
r = r∗. (13)
Buyers must also select identical strategies. It is easy to prove that this implies each buyer





for all i =1 ,2,...,S. (14)
We can now provide the following deﬁnition of symmetric equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2. Given a commitment technology θ, a strongly symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium (SSE) is a reference price r, a vector of sale prices {pn}
B
n=1 a n dav e c t o ro f
probabilities v that satisfy (2)-(4), (6)-(10) and (11)-(14).
Before proving existence of equilibrium, it may be helpful to remark on some of our
modeling choices. The assumption that buyers cannot visit several stores in sequence
captures the notion of existence of search costs that, in the short run, ‘lock-in’ consumers at
5Of course indiﬀerence across stores implies that vi =
1
S for every i. I nt h ea p p e n d i xw ef o r m a l i z ew h y
v = v
∗ necessarily implies that each element of v
∗ must have value
1
S.
9a store. Relative to richer dynamic analyses, this formulation allows a precise identiﬁcation
of the eﬀect that market composition and commitment have on advertised and sale prices.
The focus on SSE (where strategies are mixed) captures the notion that traders make
uncoordinated decisions, which seems a natural description of several market settings.
From a technical standpoint, this also allows us to clearly characterize the distribution
of sale prices across diﬀerent markets; we can focus on sellers’ pricing behavior while
‘controlling’ for the equilibrium distribution of demand–invariant to the posted prices–
without assuming it exogenous (as, say, in a random search model).
5 Existence of Equilibrium
To discuss existence we move in steps. First, given a pair (r,r∗),w ep r o v ee x i s t e n c eo f
a unique symmetric best response v∗
i = v(r,r∗) and we characterize it relative to r and r∗.
Then, given v∗
i , we prove existence of a symmetric best response r∗ and we characterize
it relative to the parameters that deﬁne the market.
5.1 Directing Search in Equilibrium
Suppose store i posts r and every other store posts r∗. The following is proved:
Lemma 3. Consider a commitment technology θ. Suppose that store i posts r ∈ [0,1]
while every other store posts r∗ ∈ [0,1]. Then,
(i) there is a unique value of v∗
i , denoted ˆ v∗








(ii) there is a unique symmetric best response vi = v∗
i that satisﬁes (10) and v = v∗






1 if r ∈ [0,r∗)
ˆ v∗
i if r ∈ [r∗, ¯ r∗]
0 if r ∈ (¯ r∗,1]
(15)
where r∗ ∈ [r∗, ¯ r∗] ⊆ [0,1] and r∗ and ¯ r∗ are non-decreasing functions of r∗.
Even if the price r posted by store i diﬀers from the price r∗ of every other store,
buyers can still be indiﬀe r e n ta c r o s ss t o r e sa sl o n ga ss u c hp r i c ed i ﬀerences are moderate,
i.e. if r ∈ [r∗, ¯ r∗]. I nf a c t ,i fs t o r ei posts a really low or a really high price, i.e., r ∈ [0,r∗)
or r ∈ (¯ r∗,1], then buyers either select store i or avoid it entirely.
10The main implication is that buyers can be indiﬀerent across stores posting unequal
prices, although they generally prefer to visit the store posting the lowest price. Indeed,
(15) indicates v∗
i =ˆ v∗







S ≥ v∗ if r<r ∗
= v∗ = 1
S if r = r∗
≤ 1
S ≤ v∗ if r>r ∗.
Why? In deciding whether to visit store i, the buyer considers not only (i) the expected
sale price but also (ii) the expected trading risk, relative to every other store. The ﬁrst
element hinges on the posted price and–unlike Burdett el al.–on the demand expected
at the store, as both may inﬂuence the sale price. The second element depends entirely
on the demand expected at the store.
Expression (4) and Table 1 indicate that if store i posts a price r above every other
store, then the average sale price at store i might also be higher than elsewhere. This
intensive margin consideration reduces the incentive to visit store i in favor of other stores.
Unless the diﬀerence in posted prices is enormous, however, this does not lead to a corner
solution because extensive margin eﬀects also exist. Indeed, greater expected demand at
stores with lower posted prices reduces the payoﬀ expected by potential customers; every
customer is more likely to end up empty handed–due to capacity constraints–but also
the expected sale price can be higher if sellers cannot commit to the posted price. As
a result, (i) cheaper stores tend to attract more buyers on average, i.e., v∗
i tends to fall
while v∗ grows as r rises above r∗, and (ii) buyers can be indiﬀerent across establishments
with greater disparities in posted prices, when sellers cannot fully commit to r.
Figures 1a and 1b depict the set [r∗, ¯ r∗] across r∗ for baseline parameters and S =
B =2 . Panel a focuses on full commitment (i.e., ﬁxed prices) and panel b on weaker
commitment (price ﬂoors, ceilings and negotiations). Draw a vertical line through some
r∗ to identify the set [r∗, ¯ r∗] of r values leaving buyers indiﬀerent between store i and every
other store, i.e., v∗
i ∈ (0,1). Start by observing that if every store sell at a negotiated
price, θ = θN, then a mixed strategy is always feasible, i.e., [r∗, ¯ r∗]=[ 0 ,1] for allr∗.T h i s
is also true under price ceilings when S = B =2 , as here too sale prices are unresponsive
to posted prices. However, in all other pricing scenarios we have v∗
i ∈ (0,1) only if
r ∈ (r∗, ¯ r∗) ⊂ [0,1], i.e., the diﬀerence between r and r∗ cannot be extreme or buyers
would simply avoid the store advertising the highest price. Indeed, if store i is charges
6Of course, strict inequalities require sale prices that are responsive to posted prices. For example,
setting r>r
∗ does not lead to v
∗
i <v
∗ if, say, pn =m i n ( qn,r) and r
∗ >q B as here pn = p
∗
n = qn.
11much higher prices than any other store, then it is best to avoid it even if this would lead
to a certain trade, i.e. v∗
i =0<v ∗ = 1
S−1 when r ∈ (¯ r∗,1].
Figure 1a Figure 1b
A si n d i c a t e di nL e m m a3 ,t h ed i ﬀerence ¯ r∗ − r∗ is function of r∗. Under ﬁxed prices
¯ r∗ − r∗ is the smallest and vanishes as r∗ → 1 (when store i is always preferred). Under
price ﬂoors, ¯ r∗ − r∗ shrinks for high values of r∗, i.e. when every other store essentially
sells at ﬁxed prices (p∗
n = r∗ for r∗ ≥ qn). We also emphasize that r∗ and ¯ r∗ depend on
market composition, λ, because of capacity constraints. For example, it is not necessarily
optimal to visit only a store that gives a good for free, when other stores don’t. If the
store is mobbed by customers then it may be nearly impossible to obtain the good.
5.2 Attracting Buyers in Equilibrium
It should now be obvious that when the buyer’s strategy is as in (15) then the rep-
resentative seller faces a trade-oﬀ in competing for customers. For example, suppose the
store posts r>r ∗. This can have two opposing eﬀects: it may generate higher revenue per
sale but it may also discourage customer visits. The optimal r maximizes W by balancing
these intensive and extensive margins.
Figure 2 (benchmark with S = B =2 ) traces W under price ﬂoors, given v∗ as in
L e m m a3a n dr∗ =0 .5. Due to price ﬂoors, sale prices are responsive to r only if r ≥ q1,
which is when the seller can trade-oﬀ some revenue per sale against the expected demand.
This trade-oﬀ is favorable until r reaches 0.5, which is why r = r∗ is optimal (indeed, it
12is a symmetric equilibrium).
Figure 2
The next lemma proves general existence of a symmetric best response r = r∗.
Lemma 4. Consider a commitment technology θ. Let v∗
i and v∗ satisfy (8) and (15).
Then a symmetric proﬁt-maximizing price r = r∗ ∈ [0,1] always exists.
The lemma is an application of Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem. While it does not
establish uniqueness of r∗, it is easy to see that there may be payoﬀ-equivalent cases in
w h i c hi ti sn o t .F o re x a m p l e ,i fθ = θN then posted prices do not aﬀect sale prices (hence
the buyers’ payoﬀs and strategies) so any r∗ ∈ [0,1] is a proﬁt-maximizing candidate.
Indeed, multiple values r∗ can arise also with some commitment, since sellers may choose
to always negotiate by posting either a very low price (r ≤ q1, under price ﬂoors) or a
very high price (r ≥ qB in price ceilings). We explore these possibilities, next.
5.3 Pricing in Equilibrium
Here, we present a theorem formalizing existence of equilibrium and characterizing r∗
in terms of the market parameters. Start by deﬁning Rk as the set of equilibrium r∗,





where A>0 but Mn can be negative; speciﬁcally recalling that λ = B/S we have
















13Put simply, ω measures the strength of extensive margin eﬀects, i.e. the change in proﬁt
due to a small increase in the probability of visits, all else equal (see the proof of Theorem
5). Such eﬀects are strong when ω > 0 and weak, otherwise. Then we have
Theorem 5. Let θ = θk and let qn satisfy (1) for all n. An SSE always exists such that
for all i =1 ,2,...,S we have v∗
i = v∗ = 1
S and r = r∗ ∈ Rk ⊆ [0,1],w i t h
RC =
 
{rC} if ω > 0
[qB,1] if ω ≤ 0
,R F =
 
[0,q 1] if ω ≥ 0
{rF} if ω < 0
,R N =[ 0 ,1],R X = {rX}
where
rX = A  B









n=1 Mnqn  B
n=h Mn . (16)
Here, rX ∈ (0,1), rF ∈ (qj,q j+1), rC ∈ (qh−1,q h) and j and h are unique values such
that 1 ≤ j,h ≤ B. In particular, (i) rC = rX iﬀ rX ≤ q1 and rC >r X otherwise and (ii)
rF = rX iﬀ rX ≥ qB, and rF  = rX otherwise.
There are three main ﬁndings. First, there always exists a symmetric equilibrium in
which the posted price reﬂects market conditions and available commitment. Second, in
the absence of full commitment the equilibrium posted price may be indeterminate, with a
continuum of r supporting payoﬀ-equivalent outcomes. Third, under limited commitment,
the model determines endogenously the equilibrium trading mechanism, i.e. the incidence
of transactions occurring at the posted price. We oﬀer an intuitive interpretation of these
results, ﬁrst, followed by a technical explanation.
Under limited commitment–price ﬂoors or ceilings–sellers have discretion over the
trading mechanism. In these scenarios choosing r is akin to selecting the probability
of haggling, because negotiated prices are positively correlated with realized demand.
Indeed, all else equal, a higher r corresponds to (i) a lower probability of haggling for
top prices, under price ﬂoors, and (ii) a higher probability of haggling for a worse deal,
under price ceilings. In any other scenario–negotiations or ﬁxed prices–the sellers’
hands are tied to either always or never negotiating, and the trade-oﬀ between r and sale
prices cannot be exploited. Hence, posted prices will generally vary with the available
commitment. We discuss such diﬀerences aided by Figure 3, reporting the equilibrium r
in economies with S =6and B varying from 2 to 40.7
7Moving left to right both market size and λ vary. The resuls are similar if the market size is large but
ﬁxed, since in large markets increments in B impact λ more than the market size. In small markets r
∗
may vary non-monotonically with λ, for low values of λ, since the relative strength of the intensive and
extensive margin eﬀect may change non-monotonically.
14A ﬁrst observation is that we expect higher posted prices in those markets where
sellers can be prevented from trading above the advertised price. Indeed, the price ceiling
rC can exceed rX while the price ﬂoor rF is generally below rX. Consider price ceilings,
when consumer are protected against price-hikes. Here stores can remain competitive even
when advertising a price above rX because they can give discounts. If demand is scarce
(B is small), however, there is heightened competition that drives rC below the minimum
negotiable price q1;e ﬀectively, sellers trade at ﬁxed prices, which is why rC = rX. With
very large demand competition is minimal, which pushes r above the maximum negotiable
price qB. Indeterminacy arises because any r ≥ qB is a payoﬀ-equivalent posting.
Figure 3
The reverse explanation applies to price ﬂoors: if buyers are unprotected against price
increases, sellers must remain competitive by advertising below rX.8 Very large demand
pushes rF above qB,h e n c erF = rX, a n di n d e t e r m i n a c ya r i s e sw h e nd e m a n di ss ol o wt h a t
r falls below the minimum negotiable price. Hence, markets with diﬀerent compositions
and commitment can generate identical price advertisements.
A second observation is that in sellers’ markets stores advertise higher prices than
in buyers’ markets. Figure 3 indicates that r∗ generally rises in B, hence in λ. This is
8This is not always the case. It can be proved that if λ > 1 and rX is suﬃciently close (without
exceeding) to qB,t h e nrX <r F <q B. This is a rare occurrence in which sellers barely need to compete
for customers. Being able to commit to a minimum price can only beneﬁts e l l e r ss orF can exceed rX.A s
an example, set qB−1 <r X <q B and observe that for j = B − 1 we have qB−1 <r X <r F <q B.
15because stores compete solely by means of price advertisements instead of, say, product
diﬀerentiation. When the market is awash in buyers there is little incentive to compete
aggressively. The converse holds when the customer base is small, which is when ad-
vertising low prices can substantially improve the expected demand (hence proﬁts). For
instance, consider rF in Figure 3. For B<9 demand is so scarce that price reductions
sort strong extensive margin eﬀects (ω ≥ 0); thus, in equilibrium sellers commit to always
negotiate with every customer setting r∗ ≤ q1 (the shaded area). As B passes 9, then r∗
grows because sellers do not need to compete as aggressively for customers.
As for the technical side of the story, denoting fn the equilibrium probability of n
visits, we report (from the theorem’s proof) the seller’s ﬁrst order condition:
 B




Recalling that p0 =0is the seller’s proﬁt under zero demand, the above expression says
that r∗ must be such that the expected proﬁt (left hand side) equals the probability of
having excess demand (1 − f0 − f1) plus an additional term. Since–as we explain in the
next section–λ is the equilibrium expected demand, then the numerator of the last term
is simply the covariance of proﬁts with demand, which is positive and ﬁnite. In a market
with many sellers this term is negligible, so an approximate solution for r∗ must satisfy
 B
n=1 fnpn =1− f0 − f1.
Note that pn equals r for all n under ﬁx e dp r i c e s ,c a ne x c e e dr only under price ﬂoors
and can trail r only under price ceilings. It follows that rF ≤ rX and rC ≥ rX, in general,
with strict inequalities when q1 <r X <q B. It is also obvious that since excess demand
is more likely as the customer base grows, then expected proﬁt must grow with λ.S i n c e
proﬁts and average sale prices generally depend on posted prices, then the equilibrium r
and the average sale price must be non-decreasing in the customer base. To expand on
this, however, we must study the equilibrium distribution of demand and sale prices.
6 Equilibrium Price Dispersion
Here, we start by calculating the distribution of demand at a representative store.
Knowing the advertised price from the prior section, we can then ﬁnd the distribution of
sale prices as a function of the model’s parameters.
Start by observing that in a symmetric equilibrium every buyer visits every store with
identical probability 1
S, independently of θ and the value of r∗. Letting Pr[n]=fn(B, 1
S)







(S−1)n for n =0 ,1,...,B, (17)
so average demand is λ = B
S and its variance is λ(S−1
S ). In a buyer’s market λ is small
while the opposite occurs in a seller’s market (where variance is the largest).
Note that demand is not independently distributed across stores since the overall
number of customers must add up to B. Thus, if a store has many buyers other sellers
are likely to have few. That is, the covariance between the demand at any two stores is
negative. Let ni =0 ,1,...,B be the demand at store i =1 ,..,S, where
 S
i=1 ni = B.
Since the distribution of demand at a store is bin(B, 1
S) then the distribution of demand
in the market is multinomial with parameters B and 1
S. Thus, cov(ni,n j)=−λ
S < 0 for
any two stores i  = j, clearly tiny in a large market or in a sellers’ market.
Now consider the representative store, given some θ = θk. The support P of the
sale price distribution is the discrete set deﬁn e di n( 5 ) . L e tPr[p|θk] be the equilibrium





Theorem 5 tells us that the equilibrium distribution of sale prices generally depends not
only on the distribution of buyers but also on the equilibrium posted price. A store always
makes a sale when there is at least one buyer so, from (17), the probability of observing




.N o wl e tPr[n|n  =0 ]deﬁne the probability that a
sale takes place when there are n ≥ 1 buyers at the store, i.e.






SB−(S−1)B for n =1 ,2,...,B. (19)
If in equilibrium r ∈ [qj,q j+1) then we say r = rj for a unique j =0 ,1,...,B;h e n c e ,rj





[0,q 1) for j =0
[qj,q j+1) for 1 ≤ j ≤ B − 1
[qj,1] for j = B.
(20)
To characterize the distribution of prices at the representative store we start with the
simplest case of an economy with full commitment. Here, although demand is random,
sale prices are ﬁxed (deterministic) so we have a degenerate distribution with unit mass
17at p = r. To study economies with weaker commitment, we start with the case of no
commitment at all, as the remaining cases hinge on this.
6.1 Sale Price Distribution Under Negotiations
Lemma 1 indicates pn = qn for n  =0 , which means that the sale price p is always
random as it depends on the realized demand n, i.e.
Pr[p|θN]=
 
Pr[n|n  =0 ] if p = qn
0 otherwise,
(21)





conditional on n  =0 .
Expression (18) easily indicates that average sale prices increase in the average demand
λ,s i n c e{qn} is an increasing sequence. To calculate a measure of price dispersion we
consider the coeﬃcient of variation, which is hump-shaped. This reﬂects the coeﬃcient
of variation of the demand distribution (conditional on n  =0 ) which is hump-shaped.
Indeed, for λ small, sellers have a small customer base so most trades are likely to occur
at low prices. When λ is large, instead, seller is likely to trade at high prices and their
dispersion is low. Thus dispersion is highest for moderate values of λ.
Finding the distribution of prices in the market is more laborious, as we must calculate
the marginal probability of each possible demand realization. For instance, if S =3and
B =4then there can be four possible sale prices. The probability of observing any price
depends on the number of sales, hence on the distribution of buyers in the market. The






Thus, the average sale prices is low since average demand at a store is low, λ ≈ 1.3, hence
trade at price q1 is the most likely.
6.2 Price Distribution Under Price Floors or Ceilings
When traders cannot fully commit to r, the distribution of sale prices still hinges on
(21). Suppose r = rj for a unique j =0 ,1,...,B. In a price ﬂoor pn = rj if n ≤ j and
pn = qn if n>j . Clearly, if rj ≥ qB then pn = r for all n (i.e. ﬁx e dp r i c e s )a n di frj ≤ q1
we have pn = qn for all n (i.e. negotiated prices). It follows that
Pr[p|θF]=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩






SB−(S−1)B if p = r = rj




SB−(S−1)B if p = qn >r
0 otherwise.
(22)
18The probability to sell at the posted price rj is the probability of being visited by at most
j customers. Of course, the seller never charges qn >rif n>jand never charges p<r .
Under a price ceiling pn = qn if n ≤ j and pn = rj if n>j .T h u s , i f rj ≤ q1 then
p = r for all n while if rj ≥ qB then pn = qn for all n,s ot h a t
Pr[p|θC]=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




SB−(S−1)B if p = qn <r






SB−(S−1)B if p = r = rj
0 otherwise.
(23)
Here, there is trade at the posted price when the demand is at least j. Otherwise, the
prices is bargained. In any event, the seller never charges p>r .The key conclusion is
Lemma 6. In an SSE we have
¯ pC ≤ ¯ pN ≤ ¯ pF, (24)
with strict inequality if comparing equilibria with unique r∗,w h i l e¯ pX cannot be ranked.
The lesson here is that the commitment technology aﬀects in intuitive ways the average
sale price, hence the sellers’ proﬁt and the buyers’ surplus. We emphasize that this is not
due to changes in the endogenous distribution of demand, which is invariant to θ. Indeed,
diﬀerences in average sale prices hinge on diﬀerences in r and the ability to depart from
it once customers arrive at the store.
Under price ﬂoors sale prices can only surpass what had been initially advertised so
average sale prices are the highest, for a given parameterization. The opposite occurs
under price ceilings, when sellers may end up giving discounts. Comparisons under ﬁxed
prices are less clear-cut since they hinge on disparities between the price posted under
diﬀerent θ but also the shape of the sequence {qn}. However, it is obvious that if the
commitment technology has a limited eﬀect on the posted price, then ¯ pC ≤ ¯ pX ≤ ¯ pF;i n
this case any diﬀerences in the equilibrium r are of a lesser signiﬁcance than the ability
to sell at a price above or below what posted (we present some examples, later).
Of course, the dispersion in sale prices is also aﬀe c t e db yc o m m i t m e n t .I ti sh i g h e s t
under negotiations, as sale prices are completely independent of r, and zero under ﬁxed
prices. In between these two extremes we have the coeﬃcient of variation for price ﬂoors
and ceilings. To provide further analytical results, however, it is useful to consider an
approximation, which is the subject of the next subsection.
6.3 Price Distribution in Large Markets
19Consider economies with identical customer base λ = B/S but diﬀerent populations
λS + S. We obtain the following result
Lemma 7. Fix λ ∈ R++ and let B = λS. Then, in an SSE as S →∞demand is iden-
tically and independently distributed across stores according to a Poisson with parameter
λ. Thus, (17) becomes
Pr[n]=e−λλn
n! for n =0 ,1,...,B (25)
Thus, in large markets the distribution of demand n at a store has approximately mean λ




The result hinges on the fact that demand co-varies little across stores in a large
market so the distribution of demand is approximately independent across stores. To see
why ﬁx λ and let the market grows in size. The demand at any store is less and less
aﬀected by the demand present at any other store. Hence, the distribution of demand at
a store approaches the marginal distribution, which is a Poisson with parameter λ.
The main implication of this approximation, is that we can easily characterize the
distribution of demand in a large market, via λ. Expected demand is higher in a sellers’
market and it is more dispersed in a buyer’s market (when measured by the coeﬃcient
of variation) since there are many stores to choose from. We can then approximate the
price distribution at the representative store in a large market, using (25).
Since prices are observed only if a transaction takes place, the sale price distribution
is the Poisson λ, conditional on n  =0 . The probability that a seller trades is 1−e−λ (i.e.,
the probability of n ≥ 1) and the seller has n customers with probability e−λλn
n!(1−e−λ),t h u s
as a l ep r i c epn is observed with probability λn
n!(eλ−1),for n =1 ,...,B. This expression can
then be substituted into (21), (22) and (23).
T h em a i ni m p l i c a t i o no fL e m m a8i st h a tw ec a nu s e( ??) to approximate the dis-
tribution of sale prices in a large market. This allows us to easily study how changes in
market structure aﬀect not only the distribution of sale prices but also the equilibrium
posted price. Especially, we ﬁnd the following
Lemma 8. Fix λ ∈ R++ and let B = λS. Then, in an SSE as S →∞we have














n=h λn/n! for 2 ≤ h ≤ B.
(26)
20Here, ¯ pk and rk increase in λ, rF <r X if q1 <r X <q B, while rC >r X if rX >q 1.
The lemma is useful because it allows us to approximate the values of prices posted
in a large market with the expressions in (26). This allows us to establish the important
result that average prices and posted prices grow in markets with higher expected demand,
for any commitment technology.
Average sale prices grow in λ because stores (i) not only can compete less for customers–
so they can aﬀord to post higher prices–but (ii) stores expect a greater incidence of high
demand, which is when sale prices can be higher. To discuss the ﬁrst element, consider a
large market under θ = θX, when every trade occurs at the posted price. Here








that increases in λ solely because the posted price rX increases. To illustrate the second
element, consider θ = θN when every sale is negotiated. Here





that grows with λ because low-demand shocks are less likely and {qn} is an increasing
sequence. Finally, notice that under price ﬂoors and ceilings we have that sale prices are
more strongly correlated with demand (whose distribution is unchanged relative to ﬁxed
prices or negotiations) while rF and rC increase in λ . This explains why ¯ pC and ¯ pF
respond positively to increases in λ.
7 Predictions on Market Behavior
We now simulate several economies to expand on our analytical results and to build
intuition on how equilibrium prices hinge on market structure and the pricing ‘convention,’
be it price ﬂoors or ceilings, ﬁxed prices or negotiations. We start with S = B =2and
then study richer environments.
7.1 Equilibrium Posted Prices
Let B = S =2 . If {qn} satisﬁes (2) then




so that q1 ≥ 1
2 if γ ≥ ¯ γ(β)=1− 1
2β. As γ capture the notion of seller’s bargaining power,
this simply means that sellers can get the greatest share of surplus only if they are skilled
negotiators. Note also that ω ≤ 0 if γ ∈ [0, ¯ γ(β)], and ω > 0 otherwise.
21Under negotiations (p1,p 2)=( q1,q 2),a n dr∗ can be anything in the unit interval,
while if prices are ﬁx e dw ea r eb a c ki n t oB u r d e t te ta l .( 2 0 0 1 )a n di na nS S E
pn = rX =
1
2
for n =1 ,2.
Now suppose sellers can commit to a price ﬂoor, i.e., p ≥ q1. T h ec h o i c eo fp o s t e dp r i c e
can be one of two types. Sellers may advertise a high price r∗ ≥ q2, which is equivalent to
choosing to always trade at the posted price. Alternatively, sellers may charge prices that
are progressively higher depending on the realized demand, setting q1 ≤ r∗ <q 2. We ﬁnd
that for all parameters, sellers will never choose to charge ﬁxed prices, i.e. equilibrium
sale prices are positively correlated with the realized demand. Speciﬁcally, if θ = θF then
(p1,p 2)=
 





2 ∈ [q1,q 2) if γ ∈ [0,¯ γ(β)]
[0,q 1] with q1 > 1
2 otherwise.
S i n c es e l l e r sc a nc o m m i tt oc h a r g ea tl e a s tq1, they can trade oﬀ improvements in
their store’s attractiveness (relative to other stores) versus the expected loss from doing
so. Thus, sellers will tend to exploit their ability to commit to a minimum price only if
their proﬁciency in negotiations is weak, i.e. when q1 is small. Indeed, r∗ = rF = 1
2 ≥ q1
only if γ ≤ ¯ γ(β). While r∗ is unresponsive to further decreases in q1,i fq1 raises above 1
2
then sellers will compete aggressively by advertising a low price r∗ ≤ q1. In this case every
sale is negotiated so there is indeterminacy in posted price, as any r∗ ∈ [0,q 1] conveys
identical information to the market.
When sellers commit to a price ceiling, then p ≤ q2. H e r e ,t o o ,s e l l e rm a ye i t h e rc h o o s e
to charge a low ﬁxed price r∗ ≤ q1 or can sell at prices that grow with the demand n.
Once again, selling at ﬁxed prices is not an equilibrium, since for θ = θC then
(p1,p 2)=
 





2 ∈ [q1,q 2) if γ ∈ (¯ γ(β),1]
[q2,1] with q1 ≤ 1
2 <q 2 otherwise.
Here sellers beneﬁt from advertising low price limits when they have a strong bargaining
position, i.e., r∗ = rC <q 2 when q1 > 1
2. Otherwise, they will advertise a high price.
7.2 Equilibrium Average Sale Prices
In the benchmark example p1 and p2 are equally likely outcomes among all the trans-
actions observed. This allows us to easily calculate average market sale price (¯ p)a n di t s
coeﬃcient of variation (c.v.) for the baseline parameters where q1 = .37,q 2 = .86 and
22q3 = .92. The result is in the mid-column of Table 1.
(S =3 ,B=2 )
(strong competition)
(S =2 ,B=2 )
(moderate competition)
(S =2 ,B=3 )
(weak competition)
––– –––––––– ––– θ = θF ––– ––––––––
r∗ =[ 0 ,q 1]0 .50 .7 <q 2
p =0 .53 0.68 0.85
c.v. =0 .44 0.27 0.1
––– –––––––– ––– θ = θC ––– ––––––––
r∗ =0 .27 <q 1 [q2,1] [q3,1]
p =0 .27 0.62 0.76
c.v. =0 0 .40 .3
––– –––––––– ––– θ = θN ––– ––––––––
r∗ =[ 0 ,1] [0,1] [0,1]
p =0 .53 0.62 0.76
c.v. =0 .44 0.40 .3
––– –––––––– ––– θ = θX ––– ––––––––
r∗ =0 .27 0.50 .72
p =0 .27 0.50 .72
c.v. =0 0 0
Table 1
Perhaps the most remarkable ﬁnding is that sellers are not necessarily better oﬀ in
markets with full commitment rather than weaker commitment to the posted price. In-
deed, when S = B =2mean sale prices are the lowest under a policy of ﬁxed prices. The
reason is that the expected demand matches exactly the store’s capacity, λ =1 , and the
market is so small that there is high risk of having no buyers (25%). To insure against
this risk, stores compete aggressively posting low prices. This reduces p since, under ﬁxed
prices, demand pressure cannot be exploited to ‘bargain prices up.’
Interestingly, average sale prices are higher even if buyers can bargain prices down,
i.e., under price ceilings. Why? Promising possible price reductions is a very eﬀective
way to compete for buyers in market scenarios where stores expect low demand with high
probability (here, one customer arrives with 50% chance). Thus, sellers can entice buyers
to their store by posting a price that is high but it is likely to be reduced.
More generally, two elements provide incentives to aggressively compete for customers
by advertising low prices: great risk of having unsold inventory (Pr[n =0 ]high) and small
23expected demand (λ small). These factors have a particularly strong eﬀect on r when
sellers cannot increase their attractiveness by committing to possible price reductions and
when they cannot exploit large demand realizations to bid prices up. Thus, we expect
that sellers should fare better under ﬁxed prices, rather than price ceilings, in markets
that are either large or have large expected demand. We validate this intuition, next, by
varying λ in a small market and then by simulating several large markets.
7.3 Prices and Market Composition
To build intuition on how market composition aﬀects sellers’ strategies and distribution
of sale prices, we modify the basic example to consider a buyer’s market (S =3>B=2 )
and a seller’s market (S =2<B=3 ) . The distribution of buyers in the market changes
and so does the distribution of sale prices as illustrated below:
(S,B)P r [ p1]P r [ p2]P r [ p3]
(3,2) 2/31 /30
(2,2) 1/21 /20
(2,3) 2/83 /83 /8
Table 2 reports values of key endogenous variables as we change market structure
adding a seller or adding a buyer (moving left or right of the third column). A central
observation is that sale prices fall and their dispersion grows as a seller is added to the
market (second column). This reﬂects the increased competition for customers, as ex-
pected demand at a store falls to λ =0 .66 from λ =1 . The opposite naturally occurs in
a seller’s market, i.e., by adding a buyer (last column).
Remarkably, adding a store to the market raises the competition so much that ad-
vertised prices end up below the minimum negotiated price, i.e., r∗ =0 .27 <q 1.T h i si s
particularly striking under price ceilings, when sellers simply give up on promising dis-
counts to attract customers; instead, they choose to charge a low ﬁxed price. The opposite
occurs under price ﬂoors: stores advertise their readiness to always negotiate by posting
r∗ ≤ q1. Hence, ﬁxed prices and price ceilings are revenue-equivalent pricing conventions,
in a small buyer’s market; the same is true for negotiations and price ﬂoors.
The analysis is almost symmetric in the opposite scenario of a small seller’s market.
Here price ceilings and negotiations are revenue equivalent but the symmetry is not exact
since r∗ is not identical under price ﬂoors or ﬁxed prices (although close).
7.4 Customer’s Base, Prices and the Incidence of Negotiations
To study how expansions of the customer’s base aﬀect sale prices we simulated a larger
market. Figure 4 considers the same parameters of Figure 3, and plots average equilibrium
24sale prices at a store (panel a)a n dt h e i rc o e ﬃcient of variation (panel b)a s ,k e e p i n gﬁxed
S, the customer base λ and the market size B + S expand.9
Figure 4a
Panel (a)c o n ﬁrms the intuition that average sale prices are positively correlated to the
customer base. Notably, the curve ¯ pF envelopes all other curves, which means that stores’
expected proﬁts are generally the highest under price ﬂoors. The intuition is simple.
Although sellers may advertise the lowest r under price ﬂoors (see Figure 3) they are
also free to raise prices when demand is high. This explains two additional observations.
First, when λ is very small, then expected proﬁts are higher under negotiations than ﬁxed
prices (the opposite is true when λ is large). With few customers per seller, high-demand
realizations are rare so there is less to gain from posting a low ﬁxed price r relative
to always bargaining. Second, committing to a policy of price discounts is superior to
charging ﬁxed prices in small markets with demand expected to be close to capacity, i.e.,
¯ pC > ¯ pX when λ ≈ 1. Price ceilings allow sellers to post a high r while still competing
eﬀectively for the few customers.
Panel (b) indicates that the dispersion of sale prices is hump-shaped (except under
ﬁxed prices, when it is zero) because as B moves above 2 stores can get more customers
more frequently. Eventually the coeﬃcient of variation drops since excess demand is so
likely that most trades tend to occur at high prices. Of course, dispersion is the highest
9Larger markets where B varies or B +S is constant and λ varies produce qualitatively similar results.
25under bargaining (it is the envelope of the two curves) as each n necessarily implies a
diﬀerent sale price, and it converges to dispersion under price ceiling since in the latter
case as B becomes large sellers eventually post r∗ ≥ qB (i.e., under θC stores always
negotiate). Conversely, as B contracts to 2, price dispersion under negotiations and price
ﬂoors coincides as r∗ ≤ q1 (i.e., under θF stores always negotiate).
Figure 4b
We expand on these considerations in Figure 5, reporting the endogenous probabilities
of haggling, under price ceilings and ﬂoors.
Figure 5 - Haggling probabilities
It is immediate that the extent of negotiations hinges on both available commitment
and customer base. We see that there is more haggling under price ﬂoors than ceilings,
26if λ is small. As the customer base expands the general trend is less frequent haggling
under price ﬂoors and more frequent under price ceilings. Thus, for λ large haggling is
certain under price ceilings but absent under price ﬂoors (when sale prices jump only in the
unlikely event of exceptionally large demand). The incidence of haggling is non-monotonic
since both r and the expected demand grow with B; these intensive and extensive margin
eﬀects have opposing eﬀects. For instance, if under price ﬂoors an increase in expected
demand raises r just a little, then negotiations may become more likely.
This discussion has an interesting implication. Suppose it is the sellers that jointly
select the ‘pricing convention’ to be adopted on the market. Suppose also that full com-
mitment to the advertised price is unfeasible but haggling involves a variable resource
cost for the seller (e.g., time or personnel cost). Then the model predicts that in markets
with a wide customer base prices would be advertised as subject to increase (e.g. real
estate prices in L.A. county) but we would see prices advertised as subject to reductions
in markets with a smaller customer base (e.g. real estate prices in Tippecanoe county).
8F i n a lR e m a r k s
We have studied a directed search market with capacity-constrained sellers and ho-
mogenous buyers. Sellers compete for customers by means of price advertisements. These
may diﬀer from the sale price depending on available commitment and the demand shock
realized by the seller. We have fully characterized the equilibrium distribution of these
prices as functions of the parameters describing the market. Hence, the model can provide
empirically testable predictions of market behavior.
For instance, consider markets where sellers have a large customer base. The analysis
predicts high advertised prices when sellers can be prevented from trading above the
‘sticker price.’ Here, each single deal is negotiated and sellers oﬀer large discounts only
if business is unusually slow (as car dealerships seem to do). On the other hand, the
model predicts low advertised prices in markets where consumers are not protected against
sudden sale-price hikes. Here, sales occur at a ﬁxed (advertised) price with occasional
high-price sales when demand is unusually large (as motels seem to do).
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28Appendix
Proof that v = v∗ implies vi = v∗
i = 1
S
Suppose r = r∗ and v∗
h > 0 but v∗
i  = v∗
h for i  = h. Suppose a buyer is at store i. Then,
 B−1
n=1 fn(v∗
i ;B−1) is the probability that store i i sv i s i t e db ya tl e a s to n em o r ec u s t o m e r .
Recall that pn is non-decreasing in n and that fn(v∗
i ;B−1) falls in v∗
i for n small and grows
for n large. Thus, as v∗
i rises above v∗
h we have that Ui falls as the probability of trading
at low prices (the probability that n is small) falls, while the probability of trading at high
prices (the probability that n is large) rises. Therefore if v∗
i >v ∗
h then Ui <U h.B u tt h e n
setting v∗
i =0is optimal. It follows that W(r∗)=0 , which is not an equilibrium. Seller i
could improve his payoﬀ by setting r<r ∗. If v∗
i <v ∗
h then Ui >U h and this cannot be an
equilibrium either since it implies v∗
i =1and v∗
h =0 . This this contradicts our conjecture
v∗
h > 0, made above. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium vi = v∗
i = 1
S for all i.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3
Suppose that store i posts r ∈ [0,1] and every other store posts r∗ ∈ [0,1] (possibly
diﬀerent than r). Given demand n, denote by pn and p∗
n t h es a l ep r i c e sa ts t o r ei and in
any other store; sale prices satisfy (4).
Suppose every buyer selects the vector v∗, visiting store i with probability v∗
i and any
other store with probability v∗. Now consider the representative buyer, whose strategy
vector is v. According to (10) this buyer is indiﬀerent between stores i and any other






















1 − (1 − v)B
Bv
.
Using (8) we have v∗ as a function of v∗


















It follows from (10) that vi =0if g(v∗
i ) > 1, vi ∈ [0,1] if g(v∗
i )=1and vi =1if g(v∗
i ) < 1.
29Now we examine some of the properties of g. To start, g (v∗















strictly decreasing sequence, since pn is non-decreasing in n (from (4)). It follows that
∂Ui
∂v∗
i < 0 and ∂U
∂v∗ < 0, since less weight is given to low prices (low n) and more to high







i > 0 since ∂v∗
∂v∗
i < 0 from (8). Therefore g (v∗
i ) > 0.
Now consider the end points of g.W h e nv∗




i )B−1 =1for v∗
i =0 . Since v∗ = 1














B−1 (1 − v∗












n+1 (1 − p∗
n+1) ≤ 1 − p1
g(1) ≥ 1 if B(1 − p∗
1) ≥ 1 − pB.
(29)
It should be obvious that since g (v∗
i ) > 0, if g(0) ≤ 1 ≤ g(1) then by the intermediate




i ∈ [0,1] : g(v∗
i )=1 }.
Since g is a continuous function of r and r∗ then we let ˆ v∗
i :[ 0 ,1]2 → [0,1], a continuous
function. Since
∂pn
∂r ≥ 0 and
∂p∗
n
∂r∗ ≥ 0 then we have ∂U




∂r∗ ≤ 0 ≤
∂g(ˆ v∗
i )
∂r . Using g(ˆ v∗












That is, ˆ v∗
i is non-decreasing in r∗. Similarly,
dˆ v∗
i
∂r ≤ 0. In particular it should be clear
that ˆ v∗
i =0when g(0) = 1 (since g(v∗
i ) > 1 for all v∗
i > 0), ˆ v∗
i =1when g(1) = 1 (since
g(v∗
i ) < 1 for all v∗
i < 1) and ˆ v∗
i ∈ (0,1) when g(0) < 1 <g (1).
We now determine the ﬁxed points in the buyer’s strategy.
Case 1. Sale prices are independent of posted prices
Here we have p∗
n = pn for all n and all (r,r∗). Clearly from (28) we have g(v∗
i )=1
if and only if v∗
i = v∗ = 1
S. Moreover, g(0) < 1 <g (1) since p1 ≤ pn ≤ pB for any
1 <n<B .S i n c evi ∈ [0,1] when g( 1
S)=1 , then it follows that vi = v∗
i = v∗ = 1
S is a
ﬁxed point to the strategy of buyers.
Case 2. Sale prices are a function of posted prices
30Now suppose p∗
n  = pn for some n and some (r,r∗).
In this case, (4) tells us that the sale price is a non-decreasing function of the posted
price, in general, and it is strictly decreasing for some n ≥ 1 and some posted prices.
Of course this depends on the pricing convention adopted and n, as discussed in section
3.2 (see Table 1). In particular, we have to realize that
∂pn
∂r =1for some n ≥ 1 and
some r ∈ [0,1] and
∂p∗
n
∂r∗ =1for some n ≥ 1 and some r∗ ∈ [0,1]. It follows that we have
∂U
∂r < 0 or ∂U
∂r∗ < 0 for some (r,r∗) ∈ [0,1]2. The immediate implication is that (29) is not
satisﬁed for all (r,r∗); that is, g(0) > 1 or g(1) < 1 for some (r,r∗) ∈ [0,1]2. Thus, we
must examine the behavior of g(0) and g(1).




∂r ≥ 0 it easily follows that g(0) < 1 also for r<r ∗. Notice that, for some pricing
convention used and for some r∗, t h e r ec a nm a yo rm a yn o tb ea nr>r ∗ such that
g(0) > 1 (for example under ﬁxed prices, we have pn = r and p∗
n = r∗ so r ≈ 1 implies
g(0) > 1). Thus consider two cases, given r∗ and a pricing convention: (i) g(r)=1for
some r ∈ (r∗,1] and (ii) g(r) < 1 for all r ∈ [0,1].
• Case (i): In this case we let α0(r∗) ∈ (r∗,1] denote the value of r such that g(0) = 1;
since
∂(1−p1)
∂r ≤ 0 and
∂p∗
n
∂r∗ ≥ 0 it follows that α0(r∗) is unique, α 
0(r∗) ≥ 0,a n d
g(0) ≥ 1 for all r ≥ α0(r∗). Also, since g (v∗
i ) > 0 then if r ≥ α0(r∗) we have
g(v∗
i ) ≥ 1 for all v∗
i ∈ [0,1].
• Case (ii): Of course, g(0) < 1 may hold for all r given some r∗ and some pricing
convention; for example, if pn =m i n ( qn,r) and r∗ = qB then g(0) < 1 since p∗
n = qn





n+1 (1−qn+1). In this case,
α0(r∗) does not exist. Therefore, for notational convenience we deﬁne a variable
K>1 and say g(0) ≥ 1 for all r ≥ K;t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt os t a t i n gt h a tg(0) < 1
for all r since r ∈ [0,1]. Thus, let ¯ α(r∗)=α0(r∗) if there exists some r ∈ [0,1] such
that g(0) = 1,a n dw el e t¯ α(r∗)=K otherwise.
Consider g(1).N o t i c e t h a t g(1) > 1 when r = r∗ (since p∗
1 ≤ pB and B ≥ 2);s i n c e
∂pB
∂r ≥ 0 this implies g(1) > 1 for r ≥ r∗. Of course, we may have g(1) < 1 for r<r ∗,
given some pricing convention and some r∗.
• If g(1) = 1 for some r ∈ [0,1] then, by an argument similar to the above, it follows
that there exists an α1(r∗) ∈ [0,r∗) with α 
1(r∗) ≥ 0, such that if r ≤ α1(r∗) then
g(1) ≤ 1. Since g (v∗
i ) > 0 then if such an α1(r∗) exists and r ≤ α1(r∗), then we
have g(1) ≤ 1 for all v∗
i ∈ [0,1].N o t i c et h a tα1(r∗) < α0(r∗).
31• If g(1) > 1 for every r ∈ [0,1] then α1(r∗) does not exist; for example, let pn =
min(qn,r) and r∗ = qB in which case B(1 − min(q1,r)) ≥ B(1 − q1) > 1 − qB. In
these instances, for convenience we say that say g(1) ≤ 1 for all r ≤− K;t h i si s
equivalent to stating that g(1) > 1 for all r since r ≥ 0. Thus, let α(r∗)=α1(r∗) if
there exists some r ∈ [0,1] such that g(1) = 1,a n dw el e tα(r∗)=−K otherwise.
Notice that α(r∗) < ¯ α(r∗) so (α(r∗), ¯ α(r∗)) is nonempty. We also emphasize that the
set A =( α(r∗), ¯ α(r∗)) ∩ [0,1] ⊆ [0,1]. That is the bounds α(r∗) and ¯ α(r∗) may not be
binding. Thus let r∗ =m a x( 0 ,α(r∗)) be the smallest element in A and ¯ r∗ =m i n( ¯ α(r∗),1)






and note that [0,r∗)=∅ if α(r∗)=−K (since r∗ =0 )and (¯ r∗,1] = ∅ if ¯ α(r∗)=K (when
¯ r∗ =1 )while [0,1] ⊇ [r∗, ¯ r∗]  = ∅ always. Since α 
0(r∗),α 




Observe that r∗ ∈ [r∗, ¯ r∗]. This is because if r∗ > 0 then r∗ =m a x ( 0 ,α(r∗)) =
α1(r∗) <r ∗. If ¯ r∗ < 1 then we have ¯ r∗ =m i n ( ¯ α(r∗),1) = α0(r∗) >r ∗. If r∗ =0then
r∗ ≤ r∗ ∈ [0,1] and if ¯ r∗ =1then ¯ r∗ ≥ r∗ ∈ [0,1]. Thus r∗ ∈ [r∗, ¯ r∗].
Now, recall that if r ∈ [r∗, ¯ r∗] then g(0) ≤ 1 ≤ g(1).I nt h a tc a s ew eh a v eUi = U for
v∗
i =ˆ v∗














= U for v∗
i =ˆ v∗
i ,U i >Ufor v∗
i ∈ [0, ˆ v∗
i ), else Ui <U
<U for v∗
i ∈ [0,1].
Recall that [0,r∗) and (¯ r∗,1] c a nb ee m p t ys e t s ,a sw e l la s[0, ˆ v∗
i ) if ˆ v∗


















=[ 0 ,1] if v∗
i =ˆ v∗
i ,v i =1if v∗
i ∈ [0, ˆ v∗
i ), else vi =0
=0 for v∗
i ∈ [0,1].
Hence, the symmetric equilibrium strategy vi = v∗






1 if r ∈ [0,r∗)
ˆ v∗
i if r ∈ [r∗, ¯ r∗]
0 if r ∈ (¯ r∗,1].
32Observe that v :[ 0 ,1] × [0,1] → [0,1] is a continuous function. It is easy to determine
from (27) and (8) that vi = v∗
i = 1
S only when r = r∗. Since
dˆ v∗
i
∂r ≤ 0 ≤
dˆ v∗
i







S ≥ v∗ if r<r ∗
= v∗ = 1
S if r = r∗
≤ 1
S ≤ v∗ if r>r ∗.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4
Consider ﬁrst the case θ = θN. It is obvious that any r = r∗ ∈ [0,1] is a symmetric
equilibrium since pn and p∗
n are independent of posted prices.
Now consider any case where θ  = θN. This implies
∂pn
∂r > 0 for some n and some
r ∈ [0,1], from (4).







i satisﬁes (15) and pn satisﬁes (4). We have earlier established that fn(B,v∗
i )
is continuous in r and r∗ (since v∗
i is continuous) and pn is continuous in r. Thus, W :
[0,1] × [0,1] → [0,1] is continuous in both arguments (being a linear combination of





Recall the deﬁnition of the value function ˆ W(r) and of the correspondence of maxi-
mizers µ(r∗). By Berge’s Maximum Theorem it follows that ˆ W(r) is continuous and the
“argmax” correspondence µ is upper hemicontinuous with compact values. By Theorems
14.11 and 14.12 in Aliprantis et al. we also have that µ has a closed graph. We can then
apply Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem to determine that the set of ﬁxed points of µ is
compact and non-empty.
Now observe from Lemmas 3 and 4 that ˆ v∗
i =0is possible only if r =¯ r∗ (when
g(0) = 1 is possible) while ˆ v∗
i =1is possible only if r = r∗ (when g(1) = 1 is possible). In
all other instances ˆ v∗
i ∈ (0,1). In particular, in a symmetric equilibrium r = r∗ so v∗
i = 1
S
a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 5 )a n d( 8 ) . 
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5
Lemmas 7 and 8 jointly establish existence of a symmetric equilibrium. Here we
characterize the solution r∗ and discuss its uniqueness.






i ,B)(1− pn) and U = 1
Bv∗
 B
























i ,B) − Bv∗














n=1 fn (v∗,B)(1− p∗
n). (31)




vn (1 − v)
B−n so that
∂fn(v)
∂v = fn(v) n−Bv
v(1−v).
Recall that seller i chooses r taking as given r∗.T h i s i n ﬂuences v∗
i and v∗ via the






∂r . We know from
L e m m a3t h a t
∂v∗
i
∂r ≤ 0 and we know that v∗
i |r=r∗ = 1
S. Thus we can characterize the
equilibrium r∗ by studying ∂W
∂v∗
i for v∗
i ∈ [0,1]. In particular, we note that if a unique
equilibrium exists, then it must be that ∂W
∂v∗
i
     
r=r∗ =0 .
From (31) above, recalling that v∗ =
1−v∗
i






























In equilibrium r = r∗ and v∗
i = v∗ = 1
S. We can then evaluate (32) at r = r∗, which
means also imposing v∗
























n=1 Mn = S2
 




>A= S2 (1 − f0 − f1) > 0. (33)















 B−1 . We also deﬁne
ω =
 B
n=1 Mnqn − A
S − 1
.
We now study the behavior of ∆(r∗) on [0,1] under every pricing convention, denoting
∆ (r∗)=
∂∆(r∗)
∂r∗ . Notice that in equilibrium we must have ∆(r∗)=0so that using the
expression above in equilibrium we must have
 B




Since p0 =0we can write E[n]=
 B
n=1 fnn = λ = Bv and
 B
n=1 fn(n − λ)pn =
 B
n=1 fnnpn − λ
 B
n=1 fnpn = E[np] − E[n]E[p]= cov[n,p]
where p ∈ P ∪{0} is a random variable represented proﬁts. Thus, in equilibrium we need
E [p]=1− f0 − f1 +
cov[n,p]
S−1 . (35)
1) Case θ = θX
Here we have p∗




     
r=r∗ < 0
always. Thus the set of maxima must satisfy ∆(r∗)=0 , i.e. ∂W
∂v∗
i
     





Notice that ∆ (r∗)=
 B
n=1 Mn
S−1 > 0 from (33). Also, ∆(0) = −A
S−1 < 0 and ∆(1) =
 B
n=1 Mn−A
S−1 > 0 from (33). Therefore, the Intermediate Value Theorem establishes there
exists a unique rX ∈ (0,1) such that if r∗ = rX then ∆(r∗)=0 . Solving (36) we obtain
rX = A  B
n=1 Mn
It follows that r = r∗ = rX is the unique maximum of W, hence the unique equilibrium.
2) Case θ = θF
Here p∗




     





     
r=r∗ = ∆ (r∗)=0when r∗ ∈ [0,q 1). Thus, we have
∂W
∂r











     
r=r∗ if r∗ ∈ [q1,1]
35It follows that we must concentrate on studying ∆(r∗) on [q1,1]. Obviously, if ∆(r∗) > 0
on that set, then we have ∂W
∂r
   
r=r∗ < 0 for all r∗ ∈ [q1,1] so we have r∗ ∈ [0,q 1) is
the equilibrium set. To have a unique interior equilibrium we need ∆(r∗)=0for some
r∗ ∈ (q1,1). Thus study ∆ on the set [q1,1], where ∆ is continuous but not continuously
diﬀerentiable.
Recall that we have deﬁned qB+1 =1 . Thus, suppose r∗ = rj ∈ [qj,q j+1) ⊂ [q1,1] for








⇒ ∆  (rj)=
 j
n=1 Mn
S−1 for rj ∈ [qj,q j+1).
Call the expression in square brackets Qn (which might be negative or positive). Observe
that {Qn} is a decreasing sequence with Q1 > 0 always and QB < 0 if B>S .R e c a l la l s o
that rj <q n for n ≥ j +1 . Thus when B ≤ S, we have Mn ≥ 0 for all n and therefore
∆  (rj) > 0 for rj ∈ [qj,q j+1) and ∆(rj) < ∆(rj+1) if B ≤ S. Therefore, ∆(r∗) is strictly
increasing in r∗ ∈ [q1,1] if B ≤ S.
If B>Sthen there exists some 1 < ¯ n<Bsuch that Mn ≥ 0 for n ≤ ¯ n and Mn < 0
for n>¯ n. Since from (33) we have
 B




n=1 Mn > 0 for
all j<Bbecause Mn ≥ 0 for n small and Mn < 0 for n large. Thus ∆  (rj) > 0 for
rj ∈ [qj,q j+1) for all j,i fB>S.Now, observe that B>Sthen we have ∆(rj) < ∆(rj+1)
since Mn ≥ 0 for n ≤ ¯ n and Mn < 0 for n>¯ n. Thus we have
∆  (r∗)=
 
0 if r∗ ∈ [0,q 1)
 j
n=1 Mn
S−1 > 0 if r∗ ∈ [qj,q j+1) for all j =1 ,2...,B − 1










Since ∆(r∗) is a continuous increasing function on [q1,1],t h e ni f∆(q1) < 0 we have
that there exists a unique rF ∈ (q1,1) associated to a unique j =1 ,2,...,B such that if









∆(q1) < 0 ⇔ ω < 0.
Thus, if ω < 0 then ∆(q1) < 0 and there exists a unique equilibrium r∗ = rF. If ω ≥ 0
then we have ∆(r∗) > 0 for all r∗ ∈ (q1,1] and ∆(q1) ≥ 0 hence we have a continuum of
equilibria r∗ ∈ [0,q 1].
3) Case θ = θC
Here we have p∗




     
r=r∗ < 0 only




     
r=r∗ = ∆ (r∗)=0when r∗ ∈ [qB,1]. Thus, we have
∂W
∂r










     
r=r∗ if r∗ ∈ [0,q B)
0 if r∗ ∈ [qB,1].
It follows that we must concentrate on studying ∆(r∗) on [0,q B). Obviously, if ∆(r∗) < 0
on that set then ∂W
∂r
   
r=r∗ > 0 for all r∗ ∈ [0,q B) so we have r∗ ∈ [qB,1] is the equilibrium
set. To have a unique interior equilibrium we need ∆(r∗)=0for some r∗ ∈ (0,q B). Thus
study ∆ on the set [0,q B) where ∆ is continuous but not continuously diﬀerentiable.
Recall that we have deﬁned q0 =0 . Thus, suppose r∗ = rj−1 ∈ [qj−1,q j) ⊂ [0,q B) for







⇒ ∆  (rj−1)=
 B
n=j Mn
S−1 for rj−1 ∈ [qj−1,q j).
We always have ∆(0) = − A






we notice that ∆(qB) > 0 ⇔ ω > 0. Thus, deﬁne rC ∈ (0,q B) associated to a unique




n=1 Mnqn+Mjqj  B
n=j Mn .
Now consider the slope of ∆. If B ≤ S we have Mn ≥ 0 for all n and therefore
∆  (r∗) ≥ 0 for all r∗ ∈ [0,q B). Since ∆(qB) > 0 since ω > 0 in this case, then we have
that r∗ = rC is the unique equilibrium, by the intermediate value theorem.
If B>Sthen Mn ≥ 0 for n small and Mn < 0 for n large. In particular we have
∆  (rB−1)= MB
S−1 < 0 and ∆  (r0)=
 B
n=1 Mn
S−1 > 0 (due to (33)). Hence, ∆(r∗) is a hump-
shaped continuous function on [0,q B). Thus, there exists some value 1 < n ≤ B − 1 such
37that ∆(r∗) decreases for r∗ ≥ qn and increases otherwise. Here we may have three cases.
If ω > 0 then ∆(qB) > 0 hence we again have r∗ = rC as the unique equilibrium. In this
case ∂W
∂r
   
r=r∗ =0at r∗ = rC and W decreases when moving away from rC. If ω ≤ 0 then
∆(qB) ≤ 0. In this case we may have two sub-cases:
• A ﬁrst sub-case is ∆(r∗) < 0 for all r∗ ∈ [0,q B). Here ∂W
∂r
   
r=r∗ > 0 for all r∗ ∈ [0,q B)
so we have a continuum of equilibria on [qB,1]
• The second sub-case is ∆(r∗) < 0 for all r∗ ∈ [0,q j) ∪ [qj+k,q B) for some 1 ≤ j<
k ≤ B − 1 and ∆(r∗) > 0 for all r∗ ∈ [qj+1,q j+k−1). Here, ∆(r∗)=0for two
elements r∗
j ∈ [qj,q j+1) and r∗
j+k−1 ∈ [qj+k−1,q j+k) respectively. Here ∂W
∂r
   
r=r∗ > 0
for r∗ ∈ [r∗
j+k−1,q B) so r∗
j+k−1 must be a minimum, and ∂W
∂r
   
r=r∗ < 0 for r∗ = r∗
j
so r∗
j and [qB,1] must be both local maxima. Obviously W|r∗=r∗
j <W|r∗=qB since
in both case v∗
i = 1
S. It follows that we have a continuum of equilibria on [qB,1].
Finally, we prove that (i) rF = rX i fa n do n l yi frX ≥ qB and (ii) rC = rX if rX ≤ q1
and rC >r X if rX >q 1. To do so, deﬁne Y ≡
 B
n=1 Mn.Then:
(i) If rF = rX = A
Y , then clearly j = B. Hence, rF ≥ qB and so rX ≥ qB. Now prove
rX ≥ qB ⇒ rF = rX.L e t rX ≥ qB. For any j ≤ B − 1 we have rF >q j+1; since
this contradicts the deﬁnition rF <q j+1 then it must be that rF = rX. To prove it,
notice that






























n=j+1 Mn < 0 or
 B
n=j+1 Mn > 0,s i n c eY>
     
 B
n=j+1 Mn
      > 0. Now, for
j = B − 1 we have rX <q B, which is not true.. So rF <q j+1 does not hold for any
j ≤ B − 1, when rX ≥ qB. Hence, rF = rX. Notice that rF <r X is not generally
true for rX <q B. To prove it let rX ∈ [qB−1,q B) and let λ be large. Then when
j = B − 1 we have qB >r F >r X ≥ qB−1 since −MBqB > −rXMB.
(ii) If rC = rX, then clearly h =1 , which implies rC ≤ q1, hence rX ≤ q1. The converse is
easily seen true. To prove that if rX >q 1 then rC >r X, we just have to show that





















For h =2we have rC >r X as M1q1 < A
Y M1 ⇒ q1 <r X (recall that M1 > 0).
P r o o fo fL e m m a6
Let n =1 ,2,...,B. Recall that in a symmetric equilibrium the probability of having
n customers,Pr[n,n  =0 ]is independent of the commitment technology as is given by
(17). Thus the distribution of buyers at any store is independent of θ. When θ = θF
then we have pn ≥ qn for all n, while pn = qn for all n when θ = θN. It follows that
¯ pN ≤ ¯ pF. When θ = θC then pn ≤ qn for all n and so ¯ pC ≤ ¯ pN ≤ ¯ pF. Clearly ¯ pX = rX.
Since rX − rC and rX − rF may be positive or negative for rX ∈ (q1,q B) we do not
have a clear relationship between ¯ pX and average sale prices under weaker commitment
technologies. However, if rX is close to rC and rF, then it is clear that ¯ pC ≤ ¯ pX ≤ ¯ pF
since (i) pn ≥ rF ≈ rX with positive probability, when θ = θF and (ii) pn ≤ rC ≈ rX
with positive probability, when θ = θC.
P r o o fo fL e m m a7
Fix λ ∈ R+ and let B = λS and let S →∞(alternatively let S = B/λ and let
B →∞ ).W e s e e t h a t limS→∞cov(xi,x j)=0 , i.e. xi and xj are independent random
variables. This implies that as the size of the market grows unbounded, we can focus only
on the marginal probabilities, that is the probability that any given seller is visited by n
buyers. In this case, this marginal probability distribution is bin(B,1/S). As S →∞the
binomial distribution converges to a Poisson with parameter λ (see Hoel et al., chapter
3). Thus, (17) implies (25) as the market grows large while keeping λ constant.
P r o o fo fL e m m a8
If we set B = Sλ and let S →∞we have
limS→∞
Mn





















=1− e−λ − e−λλ
39Then, from (16) we obtain (26). It is immediate that drX





= fn. Then, use (35) and notice that cov(n,p) > 0 (for n =0we
have p0 =0and pn > 0 otherwise) and it is minimized when pn = r for all n. Also,
cov[n,p] < ∞ since E[np] < ∞. When B = Sλ then limS→∞
cov(n,p)
S−1 =0 . Thus, an
approximate solution for r in a large economy must solve
 B
n=1 fnpn =1− f0 − f1.T h i s













n=j+1 fnqn =1− f0 − f1








n=j+1 fnrX, then rF <r X. Similarly, rC >r X if rX >q 1.
Finally, to demonstrate that rF and rC are increasing in λ notice that in equilibrium
we must have E [p]=1−f0 −f1. It is obvious that 1−f0 −f1 grows in λ more than E[p]
if r is constant (as p ∈ (0,1)). Thus r must increase in λ.
40